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FAMILY PROVISION GOES TO THE SUPREME COURT 
 
The Supreme Court has given permission to appeal to the charities involved in Ilott v Mitson [2015] 
EWCA Civ 797, [2015] 2 FLR 1409. Unless the case is settled before the hearing, it is believed 
that it will prompt substantive consideration of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act 1975 at the highest judicial level for the first time. 
 
Ilott involved an adult daughter (Heather) who was excluded from the will of her mother (Mrs 
Jackson) in favour of the Blue Cross, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and the 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Mother and daughter had been 
estranged for some 26 years after Heather left home at the age of 17 to live with a man whom 
she later married. Heather and her husband had five children and lived in strained financial 
circumstances but Mrs Jackson had written a letter explaining her reasons for ‘disinheriting' 
her daughter and Heather was aware that she would receive nothing before Mrs Jackson died. 
The Court of Appeal held that Judge Million had erred in awarding Heather only £50,000 out of 
the £486,000 estate. Arden and Ryder LJJ and Sir Colin Ryder substituted an award of £143,000 
to enable her to purchase the housing association property in which she and her family were living 
(in addition to the reasonable costs of the purchase) and an option to claim up to a further £20,000 
to supplement her state benefits (see B Sloan, ‘The “Disinherited” Daughter and the Disapproving 
Mother' [2016] Cambridge Law Journal (forthcoming) for further discussion). 
 
It is important to note that the judge's initial conclusion that Mrs Jackson's will had failed to make 
‘reasonable financial provision' for her maintenance (as required by s 1 of the 1975 Act) can no 
longer be challenged. Permission to appeal that finding to the Supreme Court after it was ultimately 
upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2011] EWCA Civ 346, [2012] 2 FLR 170) was denied in 2011. 
Heather will therefore receive something from the estate irrespective of the Supreme Court's 
decision and the issues in the case are whether the Court of Appeal erred: in setting aside Judge 
Million's determination of the appropriate award; in its approach to the maintenance standard; and 
in structuring its award to enable Heather to retain her state benefits. 
 
The Court of Appeal made two cogent criticisms of Judge Million's approach. The first was the 
fact that the judge stated that the award should be ‘limited' because of Heather's lack of expectation 
of provision and her ability to live within her current means but wrongly omitted to explain ‘what 
the award might otherwise have been and to what extent it was limited by the matters in question' 
(para [35]). The second criticism was the judge's failure to verify what effect his award would have 
on the applicant's entitlement to state benefits, simply assuming that a large capital payment (even 
including the one he made) would disentitle the family to most if not all of their benefits. 
 
Arden LJ did, however, make some questionable assertions in the course of exercising the relevant 
discretion afresh. She noted that the charities did not have any relevant resources or needs and that 
anything they received from the estate was a windfall. In addition, they were not held to have any 
expectation of such a benefit since Mrs Jackson had no involvement with them during her lifetime. 
It is certainly difficult to equate the needs of charities with those of people but it surely goes too 
far to suggest (as Arden LJ did) that the charities were ‘not prejudiced' by a higher award (para 
[61]). Her reluctance specifically to consider testamentary freedom as a principle, and her 
corresponding preference to regard the maintenance limitation as itself providing sufficient 
protection for testamentary freedom, might also be worthy of challenge. 
 
The Court of Appeal's conclusion, however, did not deserve the hysteria with which it was greeted 
in some quarters and at a macro level did not represent a significant departure from previous 
judicial approaches to the Act. Throughout the Act's lifetime, it has been a calculated risk to 
exclude from a will an adult child who might be said to have a need for maintenance, even if s/he 
has literally been able to survive without support from the now-deceased parent (see S Douglas, 
‘Estranged Children and their Inheritance' (2016) 132 Law Quarterly Review 20). The possible 
liability to provide for adult children with maintenance needs is a fundamental principle 
underpinning the Act, and it has been established that neither disapproval of lifestyle (Espinosa v 
Bourke [1999] 1 FLR 747 (CA)) nor estrangement (Gold v Curtis [2005] WTLR 673 (Ch)) will 
absolutely bar claims. 
 
The relationship between family provision applications and state benefits raises difficult policy 
issues (see, eg B Sloan, ‘Informal Care and Private Law: Governance or a Failure Thereof?' (2015) 
1 Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law 275 for discussion of the balance 
between state provision and ‘private law' mechanism such as the 1975 Act in supporting informal 
carers). In the context of provision on divorce, one of Baroness Hale's reasons for caution about 
the recognition of marital agreements purporting to relieve former spouses from their liability to 
support each other was that such recognition might allow a wife ‘to cast the burden of supporting 
her husband onto the state' (Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [2010] 2 FLR 1900, para 
[190]). But courts have previously been reluctant to consider the availability of benefits as a reason 
to limit family provisions claims (Re E, E v E [1966] 1 WLR 709 (Ch); Re Collins (dec'd) [1990] 
Fam 56, 61–62) and if the role of the 1975 Act were not to supplement such benefits (at in some 
cases) it would often serve little purpose. 
 
It is arguably a courageous decision for the charities involved to pursue a further appeal in this 
long-running case, not least in light of the RSPCA's negative experience in seeking to uphold the 
will in Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430, [2011] Ch 380. Both charities and practitioners 
will await the outcome in Ilott with interest and no small degree of apprehension. 
 
Brian Sloan 
Fellow in Law, Robinson College, Cambridge 
 
 
